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Abstract 
Children’s well-documented tendency to behave as if they know more than they do 
about uncertain events is reduced under two conditions: When the outcome of a 
chance event has yet to be determined, and when one unknown outcome has occurred 
but is difficult to imagine. In Experiment 1, in line with published findings, 5- and 6-
year-olds (N = 69) preferred to guess the unknown location of a known object when 
the object was in place rather than before its location had been determined. There was 
no such preference when the object’s identity was unknown. In Experiment 2, 29 5- 
and 6-year-olds were more likely correctly to mark both possible locations when an 
already hidden object’s identity was unknown rather than known. We conclude that 
children’s vivid imaginations can lead them to under-estimate uncertainty, in a similar 
way to imagination inflation or fluency effects in adults. 
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Imagining What Might Be: Why Children Under-estimate Uncertainty. 
 
 Young children have more difficulty responding appropriately to uncertainty 
than adults do. They make single interpretations based on insufficient information and 
claim that they know what is intended when a message is ambiguous and has multiple 
interpretations (e.g. Beck & Robinson, 2001; Ironsmith & Whitehurst, 1978; Taylor, 
1988). This apparently overconfident behavior is seen even when implicit measures 
(e.g. response latencies, eye movements) indicate that children are taking into account 
the different possibilities (e.g. Plumert, 1996; Nilsen, Graham, Smith, & Chambers, 
2008). The problem is not simply that children fail to notice the alternative 
possibilities. 
Until recently, studies had only examined children’s responses to uncertainty 
in situations when there was a reality about which the participant was ignorant 
(epistemic uncertainty). However, new studies showed that children’s difficulties 
were reduced when uncertainty existed because the outcome had yet to be determined 
(physical uncertainty. Robinson, Rowley, Beck, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006). In a game 
where children had to catch an object that would fall from one of two doors, 5- and 6-
year-olds were more likely to place two mats, thus ensuring that the object was 
caught, when the object had yet to be hidden behind a door (physical uncertainty) than 
when it was already in place (epistemic uncertainty). Further evidence comes from a 
study in which children played a guessing game (Robinson, Pendle, Rowley, Beck, & 
McColgan, 2009). The task was to guess what number would come up on a die that 
was thrown under a cup, so that no one could see the outcome. Children chose to 
guess before or after the outcome was determined (but remained unknown). 95% of 5- 
and 6-year-olds chose to guess after the die had been thrown. This is what we would 
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expect if children find it more difficult to think about the multiple possibilities when 
the uncertainty is epistemic rather than physical. Both epistemic and physical 
uncertainty lead to subjective ignorance for the individual, but they result from 
different states of the external world. That children treat events involving epistemic 
and physical uncertainty differently suggests that the state of the external world 
affects how children think about uncertainty. The evidence converges on the 
possibility that children are more likely to represent only one outcome under 
epistemic uncertainty: they tend to place only one mat to catch a block that could fall 
from one of two places and they behave as if they can be confident in the outcome.  
Despite now knowing that children are more likely to respond appropriately to 
one type of uncertainty compared to another, we do not know why this difference 
occurs. The possibility to be examined here is that once the object is behind the door 
or the die has been thrown children might imagine one of the possible outcomes: The 
object in a possible location or the number on the die under the cup. We know that 
young children have rich imaginative abilities. They enjoy pretence and explore 
sophisticated fictional worlds (e.g. Freidman & Leslie, 2007; Rakoczy, 2008; 
Skolnick & Bloom, 2006). Being imaginative has broad positive consequences for 
children’s cognition (Harris, 2000): Children with imaginary companions perform 
better on various cognitive tasks compared to their peers without such friends (e.g. 
Roby & Kidd, 2008; Taylor & Carlson, 1997). Several papers have shown that 
although 4-year-olds find counterfactual syllogistic reasoning tasks very difficult, 
their performance improves when they are encouraged to use their imagination (Dias 
& Harris, 1988; 1990; Richards & Sanderson, 1999).  
Could children, in imagining our scenarios, be drawn to imagine they know 
the currently unknown reality (which door the block is behind or the number that has 
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come up on the hidden die)? Children’s sophisticated imagination may make it 
particularly easy for them to imagine one of the possible outcomes of a chance event 
once it has occurred. This act of vividly imagining one possible outcome may result in 
children behaving as if this is this actual outcome. This imagination account suggests 
that in the Doors game, for example, the ease with which children can generate a 
vivid image of the object in place under epistemic uncertainty may lead them to 
confuse this with knowledge about its location. Similar metacognitive errors based on 
the ease with which one can bring something to mind, or fluency, are well known in 
the adult literature (see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009 and Schwartz, Benjamin, & 
Bjork, 1997 for reviews). Physical uncertainty may not cause the same problems, 
because the outcome has not yet occurred. So the child is not led to imagine a 
completed outcome and imagine this to be the true outcome. Mistaking an imagined 
outcome for the true one could also lead to the preference for guessing under 
epistemic uncertainty observed in studies such as the Die game (Robinson et al., 
2009).  During the practice trials in this game, children experienced guessing under 
epistemic and physical uncertainty. If they vividly imagined the outcome under 
epistemic uncertainty but not under physical uncertainty, they may feel greater 
confidence than when they guessed under the former. This could plausibly have led to 
the preference for guessing under epistemic uncertainty. 
 We tested whether the imaginability of the outcome affected children’s 
handling of uncertainty using a version of the Doors game (Robinson et al., 2006). 
We manipulated the ease of imagining the outcome: in one condition (Specified) 
children knew what object was placed behind the door, in the new condition 
(Unspecified) the child did not know what the object was. Being ignorant about the 
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identity of the object should make it more difficult to imagine the object in place. 
Would this affect children’s handling of uncertainty?  
Previous studies of children’s responses to physical and epistemic uncertainty 
tested children from 4 to 8 years of age. Children at all ages prefer to guess under 
epistemic uncertainty compared with physical (Harris, Rowley, Beck, Robinson & 
McColgan, in press; Robinson et al., 2009), but children’s success marking multiple 
possibilities improves with age (Robinson et al., 2006). Our aim in this experiment 
was specifically to investigate why children behave more confidently under epistemic 
uncertainty. We chose to test just one age group (5- to 6-year-olds) to prove the point 
in principle. We return to discuss developmental implications of our findings in the 
General Discussion.  
Experiment 1 
 In Experiment 1, children indicated their preference to guess under epistemic 
or physical uncertainty (see Robinson et al., 2009). The imagination account predicted 
a preference for guessing under epistemic uncertainty rather than physical uncertainty 
in the Specified condition, but no preference at all in the Unspecified condition, as 
children should be less likely to imagine an unknown object in place in the epistemic 
version.  
Method 
 Participants. Sixty-one children (29 girls; mean age 6 years 1 month (6;1), 
range 5;6 – 6;6) participated. They were recruited from and tested at a school serving 
a working and middle class population in the U.K.. 
Materials. Our apparatus was modeled on that used by Robinson et al. (2006). 
A large cardboard screen (approx. 40cm
2
) was divided into three vertical sections 
colored red, white, and green. In each section a flap covered a door (approx 2cm 
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squared), behind which there was a shelf. The shelf was cushioned so that auditory 
cues would not reveal the location of the hidden items. We also used a purple mat 
(approx. 12 cm
2
), a large die (approx. 2 cm cubed, with two sides colored each of red, 
white, and green), orange blocks (approx. 1.5cm cubed), yellow pom poms (approx 
1.5cm in diameter) in a transparent box (10cm cubed), and a collection of small 
objects (e.g. ball, plastic cat) in an opaque box (10cm cubed). During the task we 
referred to the die as a “dice” as this word is typically used by British children to 
indicate the singular. 
Procedure. Children were tested individually. Each played under both 
specified and unspecified conditions with the order alternated between children. The 
experimenter began by demonstrating the game, using a type of object that would not 
feature again in the procedure: She threw the die in view of the child, and explained 
that the color shown on the top face determined which colored door the block would 
be pushed through. The block was put in place behind the correct door and children 
were directed to put out the mat to catch the block, which was then caught 
successfully. 
Experimental Trials. In each condition, Specified and Unspecified, there were 
two practice trials (one epistemic and one physical) and one test trial. The order in 
which the practice trials were played and the corresponding order in which these trials 
were referred to in the test trial were counterbalanced between children. 
In the Specified Condition, the experimenter put the transparent box 
containing the pom poms on the table and told children that they would be playing 
with “this box with pom poms in it”. On the physical practice trial the experimenter 
took a pom pom from the box and said, “This time you’re going to guess before I’ve 
thrown the dice. Can you guess which door the pom pom is going to fall from? Put the 
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mat under the door you think the pom pom is going to fall from”. Once children had 
indicated their guess with the mat, the experimenter threw the die out of the child’s 
view behind the screen and placed the pom pom behind one of the doors. On both 
practice trials the experimenter ensured that the child’s guess was wrong so that 
feedback on the epistemic and physical practice trials was consistent and could not 
bias the child to prefer one version of the game. Having placed the pom pom behind a 
door the experimenter reminded the child, “That time you guessed before I threw the 
dice, didn’t you?”. The child was shown the die (which was manipulated to be 
consistent with the location of the pom pom if necessary), and the pom pom was 
pushed through the door. On epistemic practice trials children placed the mat after the 
pom pom was behind the door. Children were told, “This time you’re going to guess 
when the pom pom is behind the right door”. As on physical trials, if children guessed 
correctly by chance, the pom pom was pushed through the adjacent door. 
After children had experienced guessing under both physical and epistemic 
uncertainty, on the subsequent test trial they chose when to guess, with the promise of 
a sticker if they guessed correctly. They were told, “You can guess before I’ve thrown 
the dice, or you can guess when the pom pom is behind its door. So which way do you 
want to play the game? Before I’ve thrown the dice, or when the pom pom is behind 
its door?”. The experimenter manipulated the die so that children ‘guessed’ correctly 
and thus received a sticker, giving a pleasant end to the game for the child. 
The Unspecified condition was the same except that we used the opaque box 
containing the diverse collection of objects. Children were told, “This box has lots of 
different things in it” and the experimenter referred to the object as “something”. The 
experimenter emphasized that objects were not replaced in the opaque box and so 
something new was picked on each trial. 
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Results and discussion 
Chi square tests confirmed that the order in which the conditions (specified or 
unspecified first) and the practice trials (epistemic or physical first) were presented 
had no effect on children’s performance (lowest p = .577). 
In the Specified condition, in which children knew the identity of the object, 
children preferred to guess when the pom pom was behind the door (epistemic 
uncertainty) rather than before the die was thrown (physical uncertainty), binomial 
test p < .001, Cohen’s g = .24, see Table 1. In contrast in the Unspecified condition, in 
which children did not know the identity of the object, there was no preference, p = 
.798, g = .02. 
There was a significant difference in children’s preferences between 
conditions: McNemar test, p = .019, φ = .10. Children who preferred to guess under 
epistemic uncertainty in only one condition were more likely to do this in the 
Specified condition. 
In summary, we replicated the preference to guess under epistemic rather than 
physical uncertainty reported by Robinson et al. (2009), but only when the object 
being hidden was known. When children did not know what object was being hidden, 
the preference disappeared. This supports the imagination account.  
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, children did not prefer to guess under epistemic rather than 
physical uncertainty when the object being hidden was unspecified. According to the 
imagination account this is because it was difficult for them to imagine ‘something’ in 
one of the possible locations: they were equally likely to choose to guess before or 
after the unspecified object was in place. This led us to make a further prediction. 
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Recall that Robinson et al. (2006) found that 59% of 4- to 6-year-olds in their sample 
placed only one mat to catch the falling object in the epistemic uncertainty trials. The 
imagination account predicts that if children are less likely to imagine the object in 
place then they should be less likely to behave as if there is only one possible 
outcome. Thus, under Unspecified conditions children should be able to mark 
multiple possibilities even under epistemic uncertainty. We tested this prediction in 
Experiment 2. We knew from Robinson et al. (2006) that 4- to 6-year-olds found it 
relatively easy to mark multiple possibilities under physical uncertainty (Specified 
conditions) and so the imagination account did not predict any change in performance 
under Unspecified conditions. Thus, in Experiment 2 we focused only on epistemic 
trials to test whether we could reduce the tendency for children to behave 
overconfidently under this type of uncertainty. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty nine children (16 girls, mean age 5;7, range 5;0 – 6;1) 
participated. They were recruited from and tested at a school serving a working and 
middle class population in the U.K.. 
 Materials. We adapted the apparatus from Experiment 1 to have only two 
vertical sections colored green and orange. We used the pom poms, the collection of 
objects, the transparent box and the opaque box from Experiment 1 and in addition: 
blue blocks (approx. 1.5 cm cubed) and two gold mats (approx. 12 cm
2
) cushioned 
with cotton wool. 
 Procedure. As in Experiment 1, children were tested individually. Each child 
played both the Specified and Unspecified conditions, with the order alternated 
between children. Children were shown the ‘Doors’ apparatus and told that the 
experimenter would take something from a box, put it behind one of the doors, and 
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they were to put out the mats to catch it. In the warm up trials the experimenter took a 
blue block from the table and placed it behind the green door. She told the child that 
she had put it behind the green door and directed her to put a mat under the green 
door. The experimenter then pushed the block through the door, where it landed on 
the mat. On a second warm up trial the experimenter did not tell the child where the 
block was. She placed the block behind the orange door and told the child to put out 
two mats to make sure the block was caught. The block was then pushed through the 
door and landed in one of the mats. The experimenter recapped that if the child knew 
which door the thing was going to fall from the right thing to do was to put out one 
cotton wool mat, and if she did not know which door the thing was going to fall from 
the right thing to do was to put out two cotton wool mats. The experimenter then 
removed the blocks from the table and told children that they were going to play the 
game for real. 
 Experimental Trials. In the Specified Condition, using the transparent 
container with the yellow pom poms , the experimenter placed a pom pom behind a 
door, without the child seeing which door. Children were asked to, “put out cotton 
wool to make sure you catch the pom pom” (as in Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & 
Apperly (2006) we used cotton wool so that we could refer to the mats without having 
to use a singular or plural instruction). When the mat or mats had been placed, the 
experimenter pushed the pom pom through a door, ensuring that if children had 
placed only one mat, they did not catch the pom pom. The experimenter then stated 
either “You caught it that time” when the child had placed two mats or “You didn’t 
catch it that time” when they had placed only one. Mat(s) were removed from the 
doors and the game was repeated for two further Specified trials, making three 
Specified trials in total. 
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 In the Unspecified Condition, as in Experiment 1, the game was played with 
the opaque box with objects of unknown identity. Three trials followed the procedure 
for the Specified Condition, except that the experimenter stated that she was putting 
‘something’ behind the door, and asked children to put out cotton wool to make sure 
they caught ‘the thing’. 
Results and discussion.  
Children were given a score of 1 on each trial on which they placed two mats 
(maximum 3). These data are shown in Table 2. Note that children were consistent in 
the number of mats they placed across all three trials in each condition. Chi square 
tests confirmed that the order in which the trials (specified or unspecified first) were 
presented had no effect on children’s performance (lowest p = .474). 
A Wilcoxon signed ranks test showed that scores were higher (i.e. children 
were more likely to place two mats) in the Unspecified Condition (16 out of 29 
children always placed two mats) than in the Specified Condition (8 out of 29), Z = -
2.53, p = .011, CL = .66. Nine children always placed two mats on the unspecified 
trials and never did so on the specified and only one showed the reverse pattern (Sign 
test p = .021). In line with the imagination account, children’s success acknowledging 
possibilities was affected by whether they knew what the object was behind one of the 
doors.  
 The manipulation in Experiment 2 did not entirely ameliorate children’s 
difficulty handling uncertainty. Children were more likely to place two mats (i.e. 
acknowledge uncertainty) in the Unspecified condition than in the Specified 
condition, and they were more likely to place two mats than just one. To some extent, 
5-year-olds remained somewhat overconfident: 45% of children consistently placed 
only 1 mat under epistemic uncertainty even when the object was unspecified. 
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However, experiments 1 and 2 suggest that one reason children have difficulties 
responding appropriately to epistemic uncertainty is that they imagine the outcome 
and experience a false sense of confidence. 
General Discussion 
Our results offer an explanation for the surprising results reported by 
Robinson and colleagues (2006; 2009). Five- and six-year-olds, who typically behave 
as if they are thinking about only one possible outcome when uncertainty is epistemic, 
showed these behaviors less frequently when the object in the game was unspecified. 
They preferred to guess under epistemic rather than physical uncertainty only when 
they knew what the object in the hidden location was (Experiment 1) and they showed 
the expected tendency to acknowledge just one possibility only when they knew the 
object’s identity (Experiment 2). Our explanation for this is that under Specified 
conditions they imagine one particular outcome. Under epistemic uncertainty they 
imagine the object in one of the possible locations. Under physical uncertainty 
children may be less inclined to imagine a single outcome as it has yet to happen. 
Thus, under Unspecified conditions, children are less likely to imagine the object in 
place and so are better able to acknowledge the multiple possible outcomes.  
By what mechanism could imagining an object in place affect children’s 
handling of uncertainty? It is unlikely to be due to the fact that it is easier for children 
to handle uncertainty in the fantasy domain as there were none of the vocal or 
behavioral cues that are typical when engaging children in pretense (Lillard & 
Witherington, 2004). More likely is that the ease with which children can imagine the 
object in place can lead to a metacognitive error, akin to fluency effects seen in adults 
(Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Adults feel more confident that they have experienced 
fictional events if these events have been imagined (Garry & Polaschek, 2000). These 
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effects result from increased ease of processing as imagined events become more 
familiar and source confusion (Sharman, Garry, & Hunt, 2005). It is plausible that 
children, whose source monitoring is still developing (see e.g. Robinson & 
Whitcombe, 2003), may be particularly susceptible to these effects and that this leads 
them to ignore alternative possibilities under epistemic uncertainty (when the outcome 
is easily imagined). If this is the case, then other factors that influence the ease with 
which children can imagine something, such as familiarity, may also affect 
performance.   
Differentiation between physical and epistemic uncertainty has also been 
reported by researchers studying adults, although they do not use the same terms (e.g. 
Brun & Teigen, 1990; Chow & Sarin, 2002; Rothbart & Snyder, 1970). Adults predict 
they will prefer to guess about a chance event (e.g. the throw of a die) before it has 
happened. However, in reality they, like children, prefer to guess after the event 
(Robinson et al., 2009). They appear to be over-confident about their ability to guess 
under epistemic uncertainty compared to physical uncertainty. Perhaps the same 
process that leads children to behave more confidently under epistemic compared to 
physical uncertainty also influences adults. Adults might find it easier to imagine an 
outcome once it has happened rather than before and, having imagined this outcome, 
they may confuse this imagined outcome with a known outcome, or misinterpret the 
ease with which they imagined it as evidence for knowledge (a fluency effect, see e.g. 
Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). If this is the case, we would also expect adults to be 
susceptible to the specified manipulation. Adults should rate themselves as more 
confident, or bet larger amounts, in tasks where they can easily imagine the outcome 
(e.g. specified versions of tasks) than those where they cannot (e.g. unspecified 
versions). 
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We limited our samples to 5- to 6-year-old children because we were 
confident they would show the preference for guessing under epistemic uncertainty 
and the difficulties in acknowledging possibilities arising from it and thus allow us to 
test our imagination account. We demonstrated that our manipulation affected their 
performance (removing the preference for guessing under uncertainty and facilitating 
their acknowledgement of multiple possibilities) and gained support for this account. 
Future research should pursue a developmental story detailing the role of imagination 
in responses to uncertainty at different ages. For example, when children first 
successfully mark multiple possibilities on physical uncertainty tasks (Beck et al. 
(2006) suggests this may be around 3 to 4 years of age) are they also able to mark 
multiple possibilities on epistemic uncertainty tasks if the object is difficult to 
imagine? When older (7- to 8-year-old) children pass the epistemic trials, are they still 
influenced by imaginability: if an outcome is made extremely easy for them to 
imagine would they slip back to treating it as if it could be known?  
In conclusion, children’s tendency to imagine outcomes leads to difficulty 
responding appropriately to epistemic uncertainty. While we have demonstrated this 
principle in one age group, research on epistemic and physical uncertainty should be 
expanded to give a truly developmental account of this domain. Uncertainty is one 
domain where excellent imaginative skills might do more harm than good. 
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Table 1. 
Children’s preferences for physical and epistemic versions of the game in Experiment 
1. 
  Specified 
  Physical Epistemic Total 
Unspecified 
Physical  9  20  29 
Epistemic  7  25  32 
Total  16  45  
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Table 2. 
Number of times children placed two mats on Specified and Unspecified trials in 
Experiment 2. 
 
  Specified 
  0 1 2 3 Total 
Unspecified 
0  12 0 0 1  13 
1  0 0 0 0  0 
2  0 0 0 0  0 
3  9 0 0 7  16 
Total  21 0 0 8  
 
